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Abstract
This study analyzes theoretically and empirically the impact of aid fragmentation on
donors' decisions to tie their development aid to purchases from contractors based in their
own countries. Building on collective action theory, it argues that a donor with a larger share
of the aid market in a country has stronger incentives to maximize the development impact
of its aid, by tying less of it. Empirical tests strongly and consistently support the prediction
that higher donor aid shares will be associated with less aid tying. This finding is robust to
recipient controls, donor fixed effects and instrumental variables estimation. Furthermore, it
contradicts other studies suggesting that when a small number of donors dominate the aid
market in a country, they may exploit their monopoly power by tying more of their aid.
Keywords: aid, development assistance, collective action, corruption
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1. INTRODUCTION
A consensus in the international aid community holds that tying aid to purchases from the donor
country reduces its effectiveness. More recently a consensus has also emerged on the importance of
reducing aid fragmentation and the transactions costs it imposes on recipient countries. This study
analyzes theoretically and empirically the relationship between aid fragmentation and aid tying.
Borrowing from collective action theory, we argue there are important benefits from concentrating
aid among fewer donors, in addition to the reduction in transactions costs that are commonly
noted. Namely, the responsibility for development outcomes is less diffused, so donors are less
likely to indulge in practices that undermine aid's effectiveness. A donor with a larger share of the
aid market in a country has a stronger incentive to maximize the development impact of its aid
instead of pursuing commercial or other non-development objectives. Thus, more concentrated
aid should be associated with less tying of aid.
Our empirical tests strongly and consistently support this prediction. Untying aid and reducing
fragmentation turn out to be complementary objectives. Higher donor aid shares, and lower values
on fragmentation indexes, are associated with lower rates of aid tying. These findings are robust
to recipient controls, donor fixed effects, instrumental variables estimation, and to analyzing data
from different years.
When recipient countries are grouped by their scores on corruption perception indexes, donors
with higher aid shares are generally found to tie significantly less aid only in the less-corrupt sub-
sample. This finding is consistent with the argument that aid tying can be an efficient response
by donors where losses from corruption may rival or exceed losses from tying aid.
Where aid tying is more costly, as proxied by donor country size and income, it is less prevalent.
Furthermore, we find aid tying is lower in the Least Developed Countries, consistent with the
OECD-DAC's recommendation to its members on aid tying.
Our results add to the nascent literature on the determinants of aid tying (Aryeetey, Osei, &
Quartey, 2003; Clay, Geddes, & Natali, 2009). They also have implications for an alternative
perspective on aid fragmentation. Some observers caution that reducing aid fragmentation can
reduce the bargaining power of a recipient country government relative to that of its remaining
donors. If reducing the number of donors implies they have more monopoly power, donors may
exploit this increased power by tying more of their aid to purchases from contractors based in
their own countries. Our findings suggest such concerns are unwarranted. Conceivably, donors
could exercise any monopoly power in other ways, such as imposing extraneous conditionality, or
4
investing less effort in designing good projects or in a policy dialogue. In contrast to the case of
aid tying, however, reasonably comprehensive data on these other aid practices are not available
for most donors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature
on aid tying and on donor fragmentation, from aid scholars and aid organizations (most notably
the OECD-DAC). In section 3 we present a simple model of donor behavior, similar to common
pool resource models of voluntary collective action, that predicts larger aid shares (and lower
fragmentation index values) will be associated with less aid tying. The model also generates the
trivial but testable prediction that aid tying will be inversely related to its costs. A straightforward
extension of the model generate the prediction that donor aid shares will be more weakly (or
even positively) related to aid tying if corruption is a sufficiently severe problem in recipient
governments. The data are described and empirical findings presented in section 4, including
results from both OLS and IV estimation and various robustness tests. Section 5 concludes.
2. BACKGROUND
There is little agreement on aid's development impact, and on how to improve its effectiveness.
Although empirical evidence remains relatively scarce, a consensus has emerged in the development
aid community regarding certain donor behaviors, as reflected in the 2005 Paris Declaration on
Aid Effectiveness. Among other actions, this agreement urges donors to reduce aid fragmentation
and to untie more of their aid. The practice of tying aid  providing it conditional on using it
to purchase goods and services from suppliers based in the donor country  has been estimated
to increase costs by 5% to 30%, or even more for food (Aryeetey et al., 2003; Clay et al.,
2009; Jepma, 1991). The OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) therefore issued
a recommendation to its members in 2001 to untie aid to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)
to the largest extent possible, but exempting food aid, technical assistance, and aid channeled
through NGOs instead of recipient governments1. Aid untying is monitored under the Millennium
Development Goals, as one of many indicators under the 8th goal of developing a global partnership
for development. Tying aid not only reduces its value to the recipient, but is considered to be
inconsistent with the Paris Declaration (PD) principles of country ownership and alignment with
country priorities and systems. The share of aid that is untied is thus included as one of the 12
PD Indicators for improved aid effectiveness (OECD, 2011). Untied aid as a share of total aid
from the DAC donors appears to have increased since the recommendation was issued, although
figures are not fully comparable over time, as reporting standards have also improved (Clay et
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al., 2009). Untying aid is one of many numerical indicators of donor performance in comparative
assessments produced by Birdsall, Kharas, and Perakis (2011), Knack, Rogers, and Eubank (2011)
and Easterly and Williamson (2011). Donors vary with respect to how much of their aid is untied,
for aid that is covered by the recommendation and for exempted categories. Moreover, a given
donor may vary with respect to how much of its aid is tied in different recipient countries. A
donor's share of the aid market in each of its recipients is one possible determinant of the extent
of its aid tying.
There are potentially trade-offs or complementarities between untying aid and another objec-
tive in the Paris Declaration, namely reducing aid fragmentation. Recipient countries are faced
with an increasing number of donors engaged in delivering development assistance. For instance,
in 1960 a developing country received aid from less than two donors on average, while in 2006
the average number of donors per recipient had risen to more than twenty eight (Frot & Santiso,
2008). Several studies, including Acharya, de Lima, and Moore (2006) and World Bank (2003, Ch.
7) argue that this proliferation of donors imposes high transaction costs on recipient governments,
thereby reducing the value of aid. Anderson (2011) shows that fragmenting a donor's aid across
many recipients is associated with higher reported administrative costs by the donor. Knack and
Rahman (2007) show that where aid is more fragmented among donors, the quality of government
bureaucracy in the recipient country deteriorates more. They argue that when donors each have
only a small share of the aid market, they tend to focus more narrowly on delivering successful
projects, even at the risk of undermining government capacity by hiring away the most talented
public managers. Kimura, Sawada, and Mori (2007) claim that donor proliferation hinders eco-
nomic growth, and Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol (2009) refine this argument, presenting
evidence that donor fragmentation reduces economic growth in part through increased corruption.
Concerns over the transactions costs incurred by recipients in dealing with so many donors
are reflected in the donor harmonization provisions of the Paris Declaration. Several harmoniza-
tion indicators, with specific targets, are included in the Paris Declaration Monitoring framework
(OECD, 2011), although these do not call specifically for donors to concentrate their aid on fewer
countries. The Accra Agenda for Action, issued at the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effective-
ness in September 2008, asserts that the effectiveness of aid is reduced when there are too many
duplicating initiatives, especially at country and sector levels. It commits a broad range of aid
providers to reduce the fragmentation of aid by improving the complementarity of donors' efforts
and the division of labor among donors, including through improved allocation of resources within
6
sectors, within countries, and across countries. OECD (2009) suggests that donors re-allocate
some of their aid from non-significant to significant relationships (those where aid is relatively
small from both the donor's and recipient's standpoints).
Some observers, however, warn about harmful effects on recipients from excessive donor har-
monization. Rogerson (2005) and Frot and Santiso (2009) note that a low Herfindahl index is
interpreted as an indicator of healthy competition among firms in the economics of industrial orga-
nization literature, and argue that high aid fragmentation (measured by one minus the Herfindahl
index) may similarly reflect more competition among donors, to the benefit of recipients. The
DAC itself (OECD, 2011, Ch. 4) in describing the costs of fragmentation also acknowledges
that a recipient may benefit from having a diversified set of funding sources and from working
with numerous donor agencies with different areas of expertise. In addition to the policy auton-
omy that might be forfeited from dependence on one key donor, the recipient would also likely
face a riskier ODA environment if subject to the foreign policy whims and changes in economic
circumstances of a single large bilateral donor (Rowlands & Ketcheson, 2002). A donor agency
evaluation found that government officials in some countries (including Benin and Malawi) favored
a single assistance strategy guiding all donors' activities in their countries, but other governments
were not interested, as they preferred to have options, which would be undermined if donors
coordinated on a joint strategy (IEG, 2011). In general, therefore, benefits to the recipient from
this competition, diversity of ideas and more consistent flow of total funds should be balanced
against the higher transactions costs of fragmentation (Rogerson, 2005). Gibson, Andersson,
Ostrom, and Shivakumar (2005) and Frot and Santiso (2009) assert more specifically that donors
with monopoly power in a country may exploit it by tying more of their aid. They do not provide
empirical tests of this hypothesis, but if they are correct there is a tradeoff between two of the PD
goals: progress toward an improved division of labor among donors will tend to slow progress on
untying aid.
While the monopoly argument implies that aid fragmentation should reduce the incidence of aid
tying, other views of donor-recipient interactions imply there should be no relationship. Easterly
(2002) agrees that aid fragmentation imposes more transactions costs on recipients, but believes
it does not materially affect the balance of power between a recipient and donor. Donors in a
recipient country act as a de facto cartel, in Easterly's view, whether they are few or numerous.
Munro (2005) is skeptical of claims regarding the benefits of concentrating a donor's aid on fewer
countries and sectors, noting a dearth of systematic empirical evidence, but he is also skeptical that
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a typical donor can increase its leverage with a recipient government by increasing its share of the
aid market in the country. This view of limited donor influence contrasts starkly to Easterly's, but
both views suggest that a donor's ability to impose its will on a recipient government is unrelated
to its share of the aid market in the country. Finally, aid markets may be highly contestable
even in countries where we observe few donors operating in equilibrium. Recipients have been
known to accept aid from certain donors while rejecting it from others they find less compatible
for one reason or another. Donor leverage or monopoly power is difficult to measure, and available
proxies such as fragmentation indexes or the number of donors are at best crude approximations.
In empirical tests of the link between fragmentation and aid tying, therefore, a failure to reject
the null could mean either (1) available measures of fragmentation are poor measures of monopoly
power, or (2) donors do not exploit their monopoly power to tie more of their aid, or both.
Acharya et al. (2006) and Knack and Rahman (2007) offer a differing perspective, arguing
that the degree of fragmentation may powerfully affect donor incentives to pursue development
objectives. Building on collective action theory (Hardin, 1982; Olson, 1965, 1982), Knack and
Rahman (2007) argue that higher aid shares give donors a more encompassing interest (Olson,
1982) in a country's development. Where numerous donors operate and each provides only a
small part of development assistance, responsibility for development outcomes is diffused. The
more donors there are, the easier it is to assume or assert that the lack of development progress
is someone else's fault (Acharya et al., 2006). Any single donor has little reputational stake
in the success or failure of the recipient's development program. This collective action problem
is exacerbated if donors  as generally acknowledged in the literature  have multiple objectives.
Bilateral aid programs are not designed solely to pursue development objectives (public goods)
but also to pursue commercial, security or other objectives (private goods, in the sense that they
have no value to the recipient or to other donors). As illustrated by a simple model below, donors
may trade off these objectives differently, and a given donor might make different trade-offs in
different countries.
3. A SIMPLE FORMALIZATION
Assume there are n ≥ 1 donors present in a recipient country. Donors' total utility from the
development benefits of each unit of untied aid and tied aid are, respectively, Y and Y − c, where
c > 0 and represents the costs (i.e. reduction in development benefits) of a donor's decision to tie
aid. We consider the benefits of development as a rival but non-excludable public good for which
each donor gets credit, in terms of agency or national prestige, in proportion to the share of aid
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it contributes. Each donor also receives a private benefit X from each unit of tied aid it provides,
and zero benefits from each unit of tied aid other donors provide. We assume that X < Y . Donor
i's utility can therefore be written as:
ui(ai,T ) = Si(
n∑
j=1
aj,T (Y − cj) +
n∑
j=1
(aj − aj,T )Y ) + ai,TX (3.1)
where ai,T is the amount of tied aid donor i provides, Si = ai/
∑n
j=1 aj represents the share of aid
in the country provided by donor i, aj,T is the amount of tied aid donor j disburses, and aj is the
total aid donor j contributes.
Proposition 1. If i is the only donor present in the recipient country, it does not tie its aid.
Proof. When a single donor provides all of the aid in the recipient country, its utility function
reduces to:
uM (aM,T ) = aM,T (Y − cM ) + aM − aM,T )Y + aM,TX (3.2)
The monopoly donor will tie aid if and only if X − c > Y , but by assumption X < Y . It follows
that no aid will be tied.
Proposition 2. In the general case where multiple donors are present in the recipient country,
aid tying will be inversely related to the donor's aid share and tying costs (i.e. development losses
from tying aid).
Proof. When a donor has only part of the aid market, equation 3.1 can be rewritten as
ui(ai,T ) = Bi + ai,TX − Siai,T ci
by collecting terms independent of donor i's aid tying decision, where Bi = Si(
∑n
j 6=i aj,T (Y −
cj)) + Si(
∑n
j 6=i(aj − aj,T )Y ) + SiY ai. Consequently, donor i will untie its aid if and only if
X < Sici (3.3)
Equivalently, a donor will tie its aid if and only if its benefits from doing so, X, exceed its share
of the development losses, Sic. Thus, donors with higher tying costs and higher aid shares are less
likely to tie their aid 2. In deciding whether to tie aid, donor i weighs its share of the costs of aid
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tying in forgone development benefits against its private benefits from aid tying. When it is the
only donor it fully internalizes the costs, which exceed its benefits. More generally, it internalizes
only Si of the cost and other donors collectively bear 1− Si of the costs associated with donor i's
tying of aid in the country. The assumption that benefits to donors are (at least partially) rival is
crucial to this result. If a donor values all development outcomes equally regardless of whether it
contributed any aid or not, it may still tie aid, but the aid tying decision would be independent
of its share of aid provided.
The DAC's position is that tying aid increases costs, and benefits only special interests in
donor countries. By assuming that X < c, we can incorporate in the model this assumption
that aid tying is inefficient from the perspective of producing development benefits. Then the
model generates not only positive but also normative implications regarding the optimal number of
donors. Specifically, higher donor shares (associated with fewer donors) reduce aid tying, enhancing
efficiency. Reality is likely more complex than reflected by the DAC's position, however. First, for
small contracts the added search costs of a fully competitive procurement process may sometimes
exceed any potential cost savings. Second, tying aid may strengthen political support for larger
aid budgets in some donor countries, and the additional aid flows may fully compensate for the
cost inefficiencies associated with tying aid. There is little if any data or evidence bearing on these
two arguments. However, a third argument on efficient aid tying is more empirically tractable.
Amegashie, Quattara, and Strobl (2007) raise the possibility that tying aid could prevent it from
being embezzled by public officials. The implication is that where corruption is sufficiently severe,
the development benefits from tied aid could exceed those from untied aid. Then, the losses of
tying aid must be balanced against losses from graft. Accordingly, we extend the model below to
incorporate corruption.
Proposition 3. When recipients differ with respect to the incidence of graft, donors are more
likely to tie their aid in countries where losses from graft for untied aid are greater.
Proof. Where there are potential losses in development benefits of aid from graft, the donor's
benefits from a unit of tied aid are still X + Y − ciSi, but now the benefits of untied aid are
Y − gSi instead of Y . Donors tie aid if
X > Si(ci − g) (3.4)
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Where g > ci, tying is efficient: net development losses are reduced when aid is tied to prevent
aid from being embezzled. Empirically, we cannot determine how prevalent is this case, but we
have no reason to question the implicit assumption in the DAC's untying campaign that it is
relatively rare 3. For a subset of the most graft-ridden recipient countries, however, it is plausible
that g could rival ci in magnitude. Note that in the case where tying is efficient, i.e. g > ci, tying
is more likely when Si is higher. Our indicators of tying costs and corruption are too crude to
identify these cases in the data to test this hypothesis directly. However, we can test the prediction
that in a subset of the more corrupt countries, the negative relationship between aid share and
tying will be weaker in magnitude, and possibly even reversed in sign. Alternatively, the negative
relationship between aid shares and aid tying may strengthen when the most corrupt recipient
countries are dropped from the sample.
In another variation of the model, we assume that credit (or blame) for development outcomes
is equally shared among all active donors in the recipient country, rather than in proportion to aid
shares. While this assumption regarding donor motivation seems less plausible in general, some
stylized facts appear to support it. One reason (among others) as to why small donors fragment
their aid across many recipients may be the credit they receive out of proportion to their aid
shares when they have at least a minimal presence in the country. The tendency of aid to flow to
well-performing countries remarked on by some observers (Cassen, 1986) is also consistent with
this assumption 4. In this variant of the model a donor's utility function can be written as:
ui(ai,T ) =
1
n
(
n∑
j=1
aj,T (Y − c) +
n∑
j=1
(aj − aj,T )Y ) + ai,TX (3.5)
with n the number of donors present in the recipient country. This setup generates similar predic-
tions: in the general case where multiple donors are active, a donor will untie its aid if and only
if
X <
1
n
ci (3.6)
According to equation 3.6 aid tying is more likely to occur in recipient countries with many donors,
leading to higher shares of tied aid,
∑n
j=1 aj,T /
∑n
j=1 aj , for those countries. In the next section
we empirically test the predictions of the basic model and these two variations.
The model, and the empirical tests below, abstract somewhat from real-world complexity in
treating donors as unitary actors. Some bilateral donors deliver aid through multiple agencies.
Even where there is only one agency, whether aid is tied in a particular case can be a function of
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many idiosyncratic factors. Each aid project or program may involve a different combination of
commercial interests, advocacy groups, politicians, and aid agency officials. If these idiosyncratic
factors predominate in decision making, our empirical tests based on country-level indicators are
unlikely to uncover any regularities in the data consistent with the model's predictions. Our work-
ing assumption, supported by results presented below, is that there are sufficient commonalities
within a given donor's aid programs and large differences on average in aid tying and other be-
haviors across donors  that the unitary-actor assumption has some validity, despite abstracting
somewhat from reality.
4. EMPIRICAL TESTING
Comparative statics of section 3 show that aid tying is inversely related to the donor's share of aid
in a country, and that aid tying is more likely to occur in recipient countries with many donors.
Below we first summarize the related empirical literature, then describe the models and data
used for testing these predictions, and finally we present our empirical findings, including some
robustness tests.
(a) Previous empirical studies
We have found only two previous empirical studies on the determinants of aid tying, and neither
of them considers the possible impact of donor aid shares. Clay et al. (2009) analyze variation
in aggregate aid tying rates for 22 DAC bilateral donors for the year 2006. Tying rates are lower
for donors that provide a larger share of their aid to LDCs and a lower share of their aid in
the form of food assistance. Using donor aggregates as their unit of analysis, Clay et al. (2009)
are unable to test the impact of recipient characteristics, or of factors that vary at the level of
donor-recipient pairs, such as donor aid shares. Amegashie et al. (2007) uses recipient aggregates
as the unit of analysis, so they also are unable to test variables measured at the donor-recipient
level. They separately analyze tying of bilateral and multilateral aid, and fail to note that the EU
is the only multilateral that ties its aid (its aid is all classified as partially tied). Their analysis
of recipient-level determinants of multilateral aid tying is thus, in effect, an analysis of the EU's
aid allocation decisions. For multilateral aid, Amegashie et al. (2007) find that well-governed
countries have lower (partially) tied aid, i.e. EU aid. For bilateral aid, no significant relationship
is found between tying and quality of governance. The analyses control for per capita income
and population. Neither control variable is significant for multilateral aid, but bilateral donors tie
less of their aid in larger recipient countries, i.e. those with larger populations. By using donor-
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recipient pairs as the units of analysis, we can improve on these two studies by simultaneously
testing (or controlling for) independent variables measured at the level of donors, recipients, and
donor-recipient pairs (including donor aid share, in the latter category).
(b) Models and Data
Data on aid tying shares were computed from the AidData portal, a database which provides
development financing data at the project level5. AidData uses the CRS as a main source. The
CRS reports for each project the total commitment amount, the amount of tied aid, the amount
of partially tied aid and the amount of untied aid. Tied aid is defined by the DAC as development
assistance where procurement of goods and services is limited to the donor country or to a group
of countries which do not include substantially all aid recipient countries. For aid to be classified
as partially tied the latter must be the case, i.e. the group of eligible countries must include
substantially all recipients. Finally, untied aid is defined as development assistance for which
the associated goods and services may be fully and freely procured in substantially all countries
(DAC, 2001)6. Based on these definitions we constructed and tested three alternative measures
of tied aid share in estimating both models:
1. the sum of tied and partially tied aid divided by the sum of tied, partially tied and untied
aid;
2. the amount of tied aid divided by the sum of tied, partially tied and untied aid;
3. the sum of tied, partially tied, and aid for which tying status was unreported, divided by
the total commitment amount7.
The key predictions in section 3 concern the aid share of each donor in recipient countries
(eq. 3.1) and the number of donors active in each recipient (eq. 3.5). We use a cross-sectional
panel of donor-recipient observations to test the prediction from equation 3.3 that aid tying will
be negatively correlated with aid share. Specifically, we estimate the following model:
σij = ϑ0 + ϑ1Sij + ϑ2LDCi + ϑZi + δj + υij (4.1)
where σij is the share of aid donor j disburses to recipient i that is tied, Sij is donor j's share
in the total amount of aid recipient i receives, and LDCi is a dummy variable indicating whether
the recipient country is classified as a Least Developed Country. Zi is a vector of recipient-specific
control variables. The δj are donor fixed effects and υij is a well-behaved error term.
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In accordance with the model we expect a negative sign for ϑ1. The coefficient for ϑ2 should
also be negative, if donors are complying with the 2001 DAC recommendation to untie aid to LDCs
(see OECD, 2008). Zi includes the logs of population, GDP per capita, and total aid, and total
aid as a share of GNI. The DAC's focus on LDCs in its aid untying campaign is premised on their
heavier reliance on ODA (OECD, 2008, p. 4). Although the recommendation applies formally
to LDCs, other indicators of aid dependence could be linked to the prevalence of aid untying.
Although the DAC recommendation specifies LDC status only, and does not address gradations
in income levels among LDCs (or non-LDCs), donors may go further and tie less aid to poorer
countries, controlling for LDC status. Actual aid volume and aid share of GNI are more direct
measures of aid dependence, and we expect their coefficients to be negative. Smaller countries
may have less leverage in dealing with donors. If so, higher population should be associated with
less aid tying.
The donor fixed effects control for any donor characteristics that increase (or decrease) a
donor's tendency to tie aid in general, regardless of recipient characteristics. These characteristics
may include not only degree of concern for commercial objectives, but also cultural or ideological
differences, or even differences in how faithfully donors interpret the DAC's definitions when they
report on aid tying status. Table 1 presents summary statistics, by donor, on aid tying (based
on definition 1)8. As shown in the table, some donors tie none (e.g. the UK) or very little (e.g.
Norway) of their aid to any recipients. In fact, 46% of the variation in aid tying in our sample
can be statistically (if not substantively) explained by the donor fixed effects alone. However,
many donors do exhibit high variability in rates of aid tying across their recipients, including some
donors with low overall rates of tying (e.g. Belgium) and others with high rates (e.g. the U.S.).
This variability potentially can be explained by recipient characteristics, such as status as an LDC,
but also by other factors that vary at the level of donor-recipient pairs, such as the donor's share
of aid in the country.
Descriptive statistics for all variables are provided in table 2 for the main sample of 2006
observations for the year 2007. Standard errors were adjusted for donor clustering of observations.
Note that all observations where the donor is a multilateral aid agency are excluded from the
sample, because they exhibit no variation in the dependent variable. All multilaterals excepting
the EC have no tied aid, and all of its aid is classified as partially tied9. Several small non-DAC
donors are also dropped from the analysis, because they do not report aid tying status. The
sample of donors thus includes 22 DAC members (all but the EC). All recipients of aid in the
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OECD's Creditor Reporting System (CRS) are included, with the exception of a small number of
countries that were already classified as high income by the World Bank.
Although our aid share measure varies across donors within each recipient, the number of
donors does not. We therefore test the model's prediction that more donors will be associated
with higher tied aid using a cross section of 133 recipient countries for 2007. Specifically, we
estimate the following equation:
σi = β0 + β1Ni + β2LDCi + βXi + εi (4.2)
where σi represents the share of aid recipient i receives that is tied, Ni is the number of donors
present in recipient country i, LDCi is a dummy indicating whether the recipient country is clas-
sified as a Least Developed Country, and Xi is a vector of recipient-specific controls. Summary
statistics of these variables are found in table 3. Standard errors robust to possible heteroskedas-
ticity are reported in all tests.
Several independent variables were taken from the AidData portal, including the number of
donors present in a recipient country, and each donor's share of the aid given to each recipient.
Total aid as a share of recipient GNI, population and GDP per capita were obtained from the
World Bank's World Development Indicators. The LDC dummy is constructed based on the
definition in the 2001 DAC recommendation (DAC, 2001).
(c) Empirical Findings
Results for model 4.1 are presented in table 4, for each of the three alternative definitions of tied
aid. Consistent with the model's predictions, coefficients for a donor's share in the total amount
of aid are significantly negative. Using either definition 1 or 2, each percentage point increase in
a donor's share in total aid is associated with a reduction of 0.4 percentage points in the share
of tied aid. To illustrate, an increase in aid share from the mean value of 3% to 8% other things
equal would be associated with a decline in tied aid from the mean of about 20% to 18%. For
definition 3, the coefficient on aid share is somewhat larger (in absolute value). The inclusion of
donor fixed effects implies that this effect is identified solely from within-donor variation in aid
tying and donor aid shares. I.e., any given donor ties less of its aid, on average, in countries where
its share of the aid market is larger than in its other recipients.
The LDC coefficient is also significantly negative, consistent with the DAC recommendation
on aid untying. Other things equal, the share of tied aid is about 6 percentage points lower
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in LDCs based on equation 1. Controlling for LDC status, differences in per capita income are
unrelated to aid tying. Tied aid tends to be lower in larger countries: the coefficient on log of
population is negative and marginally significant in all three equations. Tied aid is significantly
lower where total aid volumes, and aid as a share of national income, are higher. These results are
generally consistent with the spirit of the DAC recommendation on aid untying, namely that it is
particularly important to maximize the value of aid by untying it in countries more dependent on
aid.
The DAC's reports on aid tying focus on definition 1. This is also the aid untying indicator
included in the Paris Declaration monitoring framework. In describing robustness of our results
on aid share to changes in specification or sample, we therefore also use definition 1, where space
constraints lead us to select only one of the three indicators. First, we consider the possibility of
influential observations. Figure 1 depicts the partial relationship between tied aid and aid share,
based on equation 1. Visual examination suggests that a handful of high values on aid share could
be influential in producing its negative and significant coefficient. Accordingly, in equation 4 we
re-run equation 1, but dropping the 37 observations in which a donor's aid share exceeds one-third.
The aid share coefficient remains negative and significant, and even increases in magnitude.
The majority of aid share values in the data are under 1%. Arguably donors have no leverage
in these cases (Munro, 2005), or if they do, there is no real increase in leverage from providing
(say) 0.8% instead of 0.2%. We therefore checked to ensure that our results were not sensitive to
the possibly spurious variation among these small values. Specifically, we tested an alternative aid
share variable in which all values greater than 0% but under 1% were set equal to 1%. Results are
shown in equation 5. The coefficient and significance of the aid share variable are affected only
trivially, compared to the base specification of equation 1.
The majority of tied aid values in the panel data are equal to one of the extreme points, 0 or
1. We are unable to use a tobit estimator, because fixed-effects tobit estimates are biased. The
value added of tobit estimation is relatively small in any case, according to Angrist and Pischke
(2009). However, we report results in table 5, equation 1 for the smaller sample of values strictly
between 0 and 1. Aid share remains highly significant in this limited set of observations.
In equation 2 of table 5, we return to using the full sample but add Control of Corruption as a
regressor. Where recipient-country procurement systems are believed to be more corrupt, donors
are more likely to bypass them and use their own rules and procedures, including aid tying. This
reasoning implies the coefficient on Control of Corruption should be negative. Although it is in
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fact negative in equation 2, the coefficient is very small and not significant. Results for the key
aid share variable are unaffected. Similar results are obtained if we instead use the well-known
Corruption Perceptions Index from Transparency International. However, corruption is associated
with higher rates of aid tying in cross-sectional tests reported below.
There are potentially many more recipient-country characteristics, other than those explicitly
controlled for thus far, that could affect the level of aid tying. The most effective way to correct
for any omitted-variables bias in our results for the key aid share variable is simply to replace the
recipient-country variables with a full set of recipient country dummies. Equation 3 reports results
from this two-way fixed effects regression. The coefficient on aid share (-.36) is slightly larger in
absolute value than in the base specification (-.34), and its statistical significance strengthens,
from the .05 to the .01 level.
We also tested other variables that vary at the level of donor-recipient pairs, and are potentially
correlated with donor aid share. These include the share of aid in the form of food assistance, and
the share of aid delivered via NGOs. These variables turned out to be statistically insignificant
(with t-stats well below 1.0 in absolute value), and their inclusion did not affect results on the
donor share variable. For space reasons these results are not reported in the tables.
In equations 4 and 5 we report tests of the effects of costs of aid tying for donors, using donor
size and income as rough proxies for costs. The value of aid in general should be reduced by
more when it is tied to purchases in smaller donor countries, because the pool of qualified firms
or consultants is likely to be smaller. Consultant fees (and thus tying costs) are likely to be
higher in higher-income donor countries 10. In equation 4, tying costs are proxied by the log of
population and log of per capita income in current US dollars (both for 2006). In equation 5 we
substitute for population the log of total aid, measured in constant US dollars and averaged over
the years 1995-2006. The rationale for this proxy is that the number of firms and consultants
residing in the country with expertise pertinent to development assistance increases (but at a
diminishing rate) with past and present aid expenditures. To test these donor-level variables we
have to drop the donor fixed effects, and we instead use recipient fixed effects, and correct standard
errors for recipient-clustered rather than donor-clustered observations. Aid tying is positively and
significantly related to both donor size measures, as expected, in equations 4 and 5. 11 Income,
as predicted, is inversely (and significantly) related to the incidence of aid tying in both tests.
We cannot rule out the possibility that smaller and wealthier donors tie less of their aid for other
reasons, but the relationships are consistent with our theoretical framework. Donor aid share
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remains highly significant in both tests.
Amegashie et al. (2007) raise the possibility that the costs of tying aid must be balanced against
losses from graft when aid is untied. Where corruption levels are high, tying aid does not necessarily
reduces its development benefits. A testable implication is that the negative relationship between
aid shares and aid tying should strengthen when the most corrupt recipient countries are dropped
from the sample. Accordingly, we re-ran the base specification separately for the sub-samples
of recipients scoring above and below the mean value on the Control of Corruption variable
from the Worldwide Governance Indicators project (where higher scores indicate lower perceived
corruption). For space reasons, table 6 reports results for the donor share coefficient, but does
not report full regression results for the control variables. For comparison purposes, row 1 shows
results for the base specification, i.e. the -.341 coefficient from 4, equation 1. As shown in row 2,
the donor share coefficient is slightly higher in absolute value (-.371) for the 878 observations with
above-average Control of Corruption ratings. Row 3 reports a somewhat smaller coefficient of -.276
for the 1124 observations with below-average Control of Corruption ratings. 12 The difference
between these two coefficients is not statistically significant at conventional levels, however.
In the remainder of table 6, we report similar results for two alternative years, 2005 and 2009.
Most of our analyses are based on 2007 data, which was the most recent year that complete data
were available when we began the study. To ensure that results for 2007 are not anomalous,
we created similar datasets for 2005 and for 2009 (the most recent year currently available). As
shown in rows 4 and 7 of table 6, respectively, the donor aid share coefficients for 2005 and 2009
are negative as hypothesized, but somewhat smaller in magnitude and not as highly significant
as in row 1 (for 2007). Although these results for 2005 and 2009 are consistent with the central
hypothesis of this study, therefore, they are not as strongly supportive as are the findings for 2007.
On the other hand, evidence on our secondary hypothesis regarding corruption is much stronger
using the data from 2005 or 2009. Specifically, the donor aid share coefficients are large, negative
and significant in the less-corrupt sub-sample of countries in each year. For both years  as shown
in rows 5 and 8 of table 6  there is no relationship between donor aid share and aid tying in
recipients with below-average ratings on Control of Corruption. These results are consistent with
theoretical predictions that aid tying may be an efficient response by donors when losses from
embezzling aid funds may rival or exceed the costs from tying aid. Where corruption is less severe,
and tying aid is more likely to reduce its development impact, then a higher donor aid share 
reflecting a more encompassing interest in the country's development  is inversely related to
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the rate of aid tying.
(d) Endogeneity of Aid Share
Regressions in tables 4 and 5 treat aid share as exogenous. Conceivably the negative coefficient on
aid share reflects endogeneity bias. For example, suppose recipients discourage aid from donors
that tie more of their aid (so their shares fall), and lobby for more aid from other donors (and
their shares rise). Then, higher tied aid would be associated with lower aid shares, due to reverse
causation. With a few notable exceptions (such as India), however, most recipients appear to
accept whatever aid they are offered, and when they can be selective they may care more about
conditionality, sector, modality, and other issues than about tying status. If donor aid shares are
determined more by donor than by recipient decisions, any reverse causation would likely produce
a positive bias. For example, a donor agency (under pressure from lobby groups or parliament)
may increase aid to recipients where it is easier to tie aid. Nevertheless we attempt to correct for
any possible endogeneity bias empirically using instrumental variables estimation.
In table 7 we treat aid share as endogenous in estimating its effects on tied aid using 2SLS.
Exogenous instruments for aid share include (1) geographic distance between the capital cities
of the donor and recipients, (2) a dummy for whether or not the recipient is a former colony
of the donor country, and (3) share of aid from multilateral donors, including the EC. Data on
distance were obtained for 1946 observations from Gleditsch (2011), and supplemented with our
own research for 13 other observations belonging to Tonga and Kiribati. The colonial ties variable
was the product of our own research, and is defined with respect to the final colonial power for
recipients where there was more than one. Data on multilateral aid shares are from AidData.
Colonial ties have been shown in various studies to be associated with higher aid from a donor
(e.g. Alesina & Dollar, 2000). Donors also tend to focus more of their aid on countries within their
geographic region, for example Japan and Australia in the East Asia and Pacific region. This likely
reflects enhanced geo-political interests, as well as lower costs in providing aid (such as shorter
flights for donor missions). Colonial ties and distance vary across observations both by donors and
by recipients. The third instrument, share of aid from multilaterals, is a recipient-level variable.
In recipients with higher shares of multilateral aid, aid shares for each bilateral donors should be
lower (unless there are fewer of them present). The share of aid from multilaterals should have
no direct effect on tying status of bilateral aid, although we cannot rule out the possibility that
the decisions of some bilaterals may be influenced one way or the other by greater multilateral
involvement in a country. For colonial ties and geographic distance, it is conceivable they could
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affect aid tying directly. If donors have more of a stake in development outcomes in recipients
that are ex-colonies or geographically closer, they might not only provide more aid to them but
also provide it in ways that make it more productive. However, our instruments easily pass the
relevant tests of over-identification in our 2SLS tests, reported in table 7. Depending on which of
the three alternative tied aid measures are used, p values for the Hansen's J test statistic range
from .29 to .38, so the null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded cannot
be rejected.
Equation 1 in table 7 reports the first stage regression for our 2SLS tests.13 As in tables 4
and 5, standard errors are adjusted for donor-clustered observations. Distance, colonial ties, and
multilateral aid share are all significant at the .01 level. Coefficients for distance and multilateral
share are negative as expected, and positive for colonial ties as expected. An F test confirms the
strength of these excluded instruments: the F statistic is 6.7, significant at the .0024 level.
Equation 2 reports the second-stage results for tied aid, based on definition 1. The aid share
coefficient is negative as in the OLS regressions, and is somewhat larger in absolute value. It is
significant only at the .10 level however. Results for other variables, including the LDC dummy,
are very similar to their OLS counterparts. Equation 3 reports second-stage results for tied aid
based on definition 2 (i.e. treating partially tied aid as untied). Results on aid share are similar to
those in equation 2, but with a slightly larger coefficient (-.5 compared to -.47) and test statistic (-
1.88 compared to -1.73). Equation 4 is based on definition 3, which treats aid with its tying status
unreported as being tied. Aid share is significant at the .05 level, with a coefficient slightly larger
in absolute value (-.61 compared to -.57) than in the corresponding OLS regression in table 4. The
key finding that donors with higher aid shares tie less of their aid is thus robust to correcting for
potential endogeneity of aid shares.
(e) Cross Sectional Tests
The results of model 4.2, tested for a cross-section of recipient countries, are also mostly in ac-
cordance with our theoretical predictions (see table 8). The key variable is now the number of
donors, instead of a donor's share of aid, so the expected coefficient sign is now positive instead of
negative. Equation 1 of table 8 reports results for definition 1 of the dependent variable. A larger
number of donors is associated with a higher tied aid share; this positive relationship is significant
at the .01 level. Each additional donor is associated with an increase of 1.3 percentage points in
the total share of the recipient country's aid that is tied. The LDC dummy is negative and signif-
icant at the .10 level: other things equal, the tied aid share in LDCs is 10 percentage points lower
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than in other aid recipient countries. Control variables are not significant in equation 1. Equation
2 substitutes definition 2 of tied aid. The coefficient on number of donors is again positive and
(even more) highly significant. The control variables are also significant in this regression, mostly
with the same coefficient signs as in the panel data tests. Equation 3 shows that the positive and
significant result for number of donors is also robust to using definition 3 of tied aid, although it
is the only significant regressor in this test.
Equations 4 and 5 replicate equations 1 and 2, but adding two more regressors, the EC's aid
share and the share of other multilateral aid. In the panel data analysis, tied aid was measured for
each bilateral donor-recipient pair, so there was no reason to expect any direct effect of multilateral
aid shares. In table 8, tied aid is aggregated over all donors for each recipient. The fact that EC
aid is partially tied and other multilateral aid untied should thus have a direct effect on the share
of tied aid in these cross-sectional tests14. The predicted sign for the EC aid share depends on
whether or not partially tied aid is defined as tied. In equation 4, based on definition 1, we observe
the expected positive (and significant) coefficient on EC aid share. Each percentage point increase
in the EC aid share increases the tied aid share by slightly more than 1 percentage point. In
equation 5, based on definition 2, we observe the expected negative (and significant) coefficient on
EC aid share. The expected negative coefficient on share of aid from other multilateral donors is
not observed, however, in either equation 4 or 5. This finding suggests that bilateral donors may
tie (or partially tie) a larger share of their aid when multilaterals (other than the EC) are present
in force. Inclusion of these two regressors further strengthens the significance of the number of
donors in equation 4 (relative to equation 1) and leaves it unaffected in equation 5 (relative to
equation 2).
Additional robustness tests are reported for the cross-sectional analysis in table 9, based on
definition 1 of tied aid. In equation 1, we add the Control of Corruption indicator. Although it was
insignificant in the panel data tests in table 4, it exhibits the expected negative and significant
effects on tied aid in this cross sectional regression. Higher values  meaning lower perceived
government corruption  are associated with lower rates of aid tying by donors, as expected15.
Results on the number of donors variable are not affected by the inclusion of the corruption
indicator.
As in the panel data tests, tied aid is more sensitive to the market structure of aid when more
highly corrupt countries are excluded from the sample. When the sample is split by the median
value of Control of Corruption, the coefficient on number of donors is .015 (significant at .001) for
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the less corrupt sub-sample, and .009 (significant at .05) for the more corrupt sub-sample16. Again,
these findings are consistent with our theoretical framework: where aid tying is less inefficient (or
possibly even efficient), the strengthened incentives of donors in less-fragmented aid environments
to act efficiently has more ambiguous implications for aid tying.
Some empirical studies of aid fragmentation omit donors that provide only very small amounts
of aid, often representing non-project technical cooperation, such as scholarships or small grants
channeled through NGOs. The rationale in omitting these micro-aid relationships is that they
do not typically entail significant transactions costs for recipient governments. The presence of
these small donors may similarly not add in any meaningful way to the competitiveness of the
aid market in the country. Providing scholarships or micro-grants to NGOs does not necessarily
indicate a willingness to provide larger amounts of aid to governments, so recipients may not be
able to use them as leverage in negotiating with their other donors. In equation 2, therefore, we
follow OECD (2009) in counting as donors only those providing more than $ 250,000 in aid to
the country. This change in definition reduces the average number of donors per country in the
sample from 26 to 20. The coefficient on number of donors in equation 2 remains positive and
highly significant, however.
Remaining regressions in table 9 go beyond model 4.2, replacing the number of donors with
an aid fragmentation index, and exploring the possibility of a nonlinear relation between number
of donors and the share of tied aid. Equation 3 replaces the number of donors with an index of
donor fragmentation, equal to one minus the sum of squared shares of each donor's aid in the
country. This index has been used in studies of aid fragmentation (e.g. Knack & Rahman, 2007),
and is based on the Herfindahl index of market concentration, a standard measure of monopoly
power in the industrial organization literature. Its coefficient in equation 3 is positive and highly
significant: tying of aid is more likely where aid is more fragmented across donors. As with the
results above on aid shares and on the number of donors, this result is consistent with the argument
that donors give lower weight to development objectives and higher weight to commercial or other
donor-specific objectives of their aid programs when responsibility is more diffused.
We tested for nonlinear relationships with tied aid in the panel data (for aid shares) and in
the cross sectional data (for number of donors and fragmentation indexes). One possibility is
that tied aid increases monotonically with (say) number of donors, but at a diminishing rate.
However, taking the log of number of donors (or aid shares, in the panel data) does not improve
the empirical fit. Another possibility is that the relation is quadratic. For aid share in the panel
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data, the quadratic specification was not significant, and we conclude that the negative relationship
between aid share and tied aid is at least roughly linear17. Quadratic relationships turn out to be
significant in the cross-sectional data, however. In equation 4, the number of donors and its square
are both highly significant, with tied aid first increasing but eventually declining as the number
of donors increases beyond 30. The explanatory power of the model (R square = .78) improves
relative to its linear counterpart in equation 4 of table 8 (R square = .72). This quadratic relation
is robust to excluding the micro-donors from the count of number of donors, as shown in equation
5 of table 9. The tied aid share first increases with the number of (non-micro) donors, but above
26 it decreases.
These curvilinear relationships are not driven by a small number of extreme values: there are
dozens of countries in the sample with more than 30 donors. However, it seems doubtful that
the decline in (predicted values of) tied aid as the number of donors increases from, say, 30 to
35, has anything to do with a more competitive aid market that gives recipients more leverage
in negotiating with donors. It is more plausible that an increase from, say, 5 to 10 donors might
increase competition, but that increase is associated with a predicted rise in the share of aid that
is tied. The quadratic relationship is not predicted by our model, but nor is it predicted by the
argument that concentrating aid in a country among fewer donors comes at the expense of giving
them more market power.
Equation 6 in table 9 reports a significant quadratic relationship for the fragmentation index.
In this case, the improvement in explanatory power is marginal (R square = .73, compared to .72
in equation 3). Moreover, the predicted maximum for tied aid is at a fragmentation index value
of .98, while all of the actual values in the sample are .92 or below. For all 133 countries in the
sample, therefore, the tied aid share is predicted to increase with fragmentation  the opposite of
what we would observe if more fragmentation implies less market power for donors in a country.
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this paper we tested two opposing hypotheses regarding the effect of aid fragmentation on aid
tying. Results offer no support for the hypothesis that more concentrated aid confers monopoly
power on donors that they exploit by tying more of their aid. Instead, we find strong evidence
that lower fragmentation is associated with less aid tying. This result is predicted by a model of
donor behavior based on collective action theory. In countries where aid is less fragmented across
donors, the typical donor has stronger incentives to pursue development objectives rather than
commercial (or other) objectives. A given donor operating in multiple recipient countries has a
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stronger incentive to pursue development objectives where it has a larger share of the total aid
market in a country. Our findings are robust to alternative definitions of aid tying, and to a strong
set of controls (including donor and recipient fixed effects). Moreover, instrumental variables tests
in our panel data support the interpretation that higher donor aid shares reduce aid tying. In
our cross-sectional tests, aid tying rises initially as the number of donors increases, but eventually
begins to fall. This result  that aid tying is lower not only when there are very few but also very
many donors  is not predicted by our theoretical approach, but nor is it consistent with concerns
that fewer donors operating in a country implies enhanced leverage on their part to tie more aid.
Moreover, in our panel data tests, higher donor aid shares are monotonically associated with lower
aid tying.
Aid tying also varies inversely with the costs of aid tying (proxied empirically by donor country
size and per capita income), as predicted by the model. We also find that aid to the LDCs is less
likely to be tied, indicating that the DAC recommendation on aid untying to least developed
countries has influenced donor behavior.
This paper adds to the sparse literature (Amegashie et al., 2007; Clay et al., 2009) on the
determinants of aid tying, and to a growing body of empirical evidence on the adverse impact of
fragmented aid (Anderson, 2011; Djankov et al., 2009; Knack & Rahman, 2007). Fragmentation
indicators (including donor aid shares) are only incomplete measures of the division of labor among
donors, and division of labor in turn does not comprise the entire donor harmonization agenda. For
example, we do not address fragmentation at the sectoral level, delegation of implementation of
aid by one donor to another, or coordinating donor missions or country analytic work. Our model
and empirical tests aggregate all ODA to the donor-recipient level. However, our approach could
readily be extended to sector-by-sector analyses in further research. For a given donor-recipient
pair, one could test the hypothesis that aid tying is lower in sectors where the donor's aid share
is higher, controlling for donor and sector fixed effects.
This study is limited to the DAC donors. Although the tying status of most aid from non-DAC
donors is not reported, much of it is believed to be tied (Kragelund, 2008). Non-DAC donors
account for a small but growing share of all aid, so their tying practices are likely to become a
more prominent issue in coming years.
Despite the limitations of our analysis, it reassuringly finds that the objective of untying more
aid does not conflict with at least one part of the harmonization agenda  increasing geographic
specialization of aid by donors. Results instead are consistent with the view that reducing frag-
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mentation  by increasing donors' share of aid in the countries they assist  enhances their reputa-
tional stake in producing favorable development outcomes. Reducing aid fragmentation can occur
without donors (individually or collectively) imposing their own preferred geographic division of
labor. The Rwandan government, for example, has taken the lead in guiding its donors toward
providing support in a more limited number of sectors, based on its own views of donors' compar-
ative advantages. International Good Practice Principles for Country-Led Division of Labor and
Complementarity, issued by the DAC in 2009, endorse this approach (OECD, 2011).
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NOTES
1Effective in 2009 the recommendation was extended to cover non-LDC HIPC countries.
2In the model a donor either ties none or all of its aid in each country it assists. In the majority
of actual donor-recipient pairs in the data, donors do tie either all or none of their aid. In about
40% of cases, however, donors tie more than 0% but less than 100% of their aid. The model can
be readily generalized from the discrete choice case to the continuous case, to predict that the
proportion of aid a donor disburses that it chooses to tie, ai,T /ai, will be lower for donors with
high aid shares.
3Even if there are sizeable losses of aid to corruption, what is at issue here is only the losses
that can be averted by tying aid.
4Vietnam is a recent example. Its remarkable success in economic growth and poverty reduction
since the Doi Moi did not go unnoticed by aid donors. While Japan traditionally has had the largest
aid share in Vietnam among bilateral donors, many others have been drawn to the country, most
with marginal aid shares.
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5See www.aiddata.org
6The qualifying term substantially is intended to allow compliance with international sanc-
tions on pariah countries. Although the DAC datasets we use are the best available, they do not
tell the full story on aid tying. Some aid that technically meets the untied criteria may be de facto
tied (Clay et al., 2009). Many donors with a high rate of untied aid (including some small donor
countries) nevertheless award a high share of aid contracts within the home country. Furthermore,
some donors do not comply adequately with the transparency provisions of the 2001 DAC recom-
mendation that call for ex ante notification to the DAC of aid contracts open for bidding and ex
ante reporting on contracts awarded.
7Nine donor countries did not report the tying status of some of their aid in 2007. In definition
3, we follow Easterly (2002) in treating aid with unreported tying status as tied. Such aid is
disproportionately technical assistance, which is more often tied than other aid categories (DAC,
2001). Definition 3 therefore overestimates tied aid, but definitions 1 and 2 underestimate it, for
the nine donors in question.
8Note that the means do not reflect donor aggregates such as those reported in Clay et al.
(2009), because each recipient country is weighted equally in Table 1.
9The EC is in some respects more like a bilateral than a multilateral donor. For example,
Martens, Mummert, Murrel, and Seabright (2002, p. 192) report that national representatives in
EC foreign aid decision-making committees spend a considerable part of their time exploring and
pursuing contract opportunities for national suppliers. Unlike multilateral donors, it is a member
of the OECD DAC.
10Admittedly, the quality of consultants may also tend to be somewhat higher in higher-income
countries.
11We do not include both donor size indicators in the same test because they are correlated at
.86.
12Dividing the sample by the mean value of the corruption perceptions indicator is arbitrary,
but results are very similar for the median or other alternative cutpoints.
13Estimations were performed using STATA's XTIVREG2 procedure.
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14Multilateral aid is thus not a valid instrument for aid share in the cross sectional tests. More-
over, the other instruments used in the 2SLS panel data tests, colonial tie and distance, are
defined only with respect to donor-recipient pairs, and we were unable to identify any other good
instruments for 2SLS tests using cross sectional data.
15Amegashie et al. (2007) find an insignificant relationship between aid tying by bilateral donors
and the quality of governance in recipient countries. Although their theoretical exposition em-
phasizes corruption, they measure quality of governance empirically with the Freedom House
indicators of civil liberties and political freedoms.
16Results not reported in tables for space reasons but available on request.
17These results are not reported in tables for space reasons but are available on request.
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Figure 1: partial relation between aid tying and aid share (from Table 4, equation 1)
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Table 1: aid tying by donor and region
donor mean st. dev. min max N
Australia .00955 .0305 0 .198 68
Austria .662 .358 0 1 103
Belgium .053 .194 0 .982 99
Canada .386 .385 0 1 108
Denmark .106 .267 0 1 50
Finland .0679 .211 0 1 86
France .197 .173 0 .917 129
Germany .396 .349 0 1 128
Greece .208 .373 0 1 69
Ireland 0 0 0 0 82
Italy .735 .309 0 1 89
Japan .00914 .0483 0 .334 99
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 73
Netherlands .269 .385 0 1 87
New Zealand .6 .414 0 1 65
Norway .00126 .00936 0 .0858 95
Portugal .0173 .054 0 .263 52
Spain .475 .356 0 1 107
Sweden 0 0 0 0 74
Switzerland 0 0 0 0 109
United Kingdom 0 0 0 0 106
United States .456 .342 0 1 128
East Asia and Pacific .223 .346 0 1 21
Europe and Central Asia .241 .351 0 1 18
Latin America and Caribbean .258 .367 0 1 30
Middle East and North Africa .255 .374 0 1 12
South Asia .233 .363 0 1 8
Sub-Saharan Africa .189 .32 0 1 47
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Table 2: Summary statistics panel regressions
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
tied aid (1) 0.227 0.35 0 1
tied aid (2) 0.208 0.332 0 1
tied aid (3) 0.297 0.384 0 1
donor aid share 0.032 0.087 0 1
log of population 16.139 1.822 9.183 20.994
log of per capita income 7.215 1.138 4.812 9.638
LDC dummy 0.36 0.48 0 1
log of total recipient aid 19.311 2.62 0 23.159
AID/GNI 0.077 0.103 -0.001 0.587
control of corruption -0.539 0.569 -1.588 1.343
log of donor population 16.800 1.440 13.066 19.515
log of donor per capita income 10.585 0.303 9.852 11.408
log of total donor aid 7.865 1.199 5.419 9.675
log of distance 8.726 0.614 5.79 9.827
colonial tie dummy 0.049 0.217 0 1
multilateral aid share 0.519 0.229 0.022 0.989
Table 3: Summary statistics cross sectional regressions
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
tied aid (1) 0.391 0.26 0 0.998
tied aid (2) 0.143 0.143 0 0.674
tied aid (3) 0.267 0.208 0 0.914
No. of donors 26.20 10.003 1 43
No. of donors with aid > 250,000 USD 20.007 9.858 1 37
log of population 15.660 2.074 9.912 21
log of per capita income 7.143 1.192 4.559 9.274
LDC dummy 0.323 0.47 0 1
log of total recipient aid 19.716 1.610 13.215 22.942
aid/GNI 0.125 0.198 0.00004 1.664
multilateral aid share (excl. EC) 0.410 0.277 0 1
EC aid share 0.151 0.175 0 0.784
Control of corruption -0.459 0.568 -1.368 1.349
fragmentation index 0.709 0.210 0 0.9203
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Table 6: Low vs. high corruption
sample donor aid share N R2
2007
All -0.341 2006 0.50
(.143)∗∗
Low corruption -0.392 989 0.53
(.197)∗
High corruption -0.247 1017 0.48
(.114)∗∗
2005
All -0.303 2057 0.56
(.155)∗
Low corruption -0.428 1016 0.54
(.208)∗∗
High corruption -0.048 1041 0.56
(.080)
2009
All -0.186 2163 0.49
(.10)∗
Low corruption -0.354 1085 0.48
(.186)∗
High corruption 0.046 1078 0.51
(.154)
Note: Dependent variable is tied aid share (definition 1). Standard errors (adjusted for clustering at donor level) are in
parentheses. A * ,** and *** respectively indicate significance at .10, .05 and .01 levels for two-tailed tests. Control
variables include log of population, log of per capita income, an LDC dummy, log of total recipient aid and aid/GNI.
Complete regression results are available from authors on request. Low and high corruption sub-samples are defined
by the sample median value of the Control of Corruption indicator for the relevant year.
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Table 7: 2SLS Panel regression
equation no. (1) (2) (3) (4)
dependent variable first stage Tied aid (1) Tied aid (2) Tied aid (3)
donor aid share . -.473 -.446 -.531
(.249)∗ (.244)∗ (.277)∗
log of distance -.024 . . .
(.007)∗∗∗
colonial tie .122 . . .
(.037)∗∗∗
multilateral aid share -.077 . . .
(.021)∗∗∗
log of population -.002 -.010 -.008 -.012
(.002) (.005)∗∗ (.005)∗ (.006)∗∗
log of per capita income .005 .003 .002 .020
(.003)∗ (.010) (.009) (.013)
LDC dummy .004 -.057 -.048 -.083
(.010) (.025)∗∗ (.021)∗∗ (.035)∗∗
log of total recipient aid -.0004 -.006 -.006 -.007
(.0008) (.003)∗∗ (.003)∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
AID/GNI .035 -.182 -.204 -.154
(.044) (.073)∗∗ (.079)∗∗∗ (.088)∗
donor fixed effects yes yes yes yes
No. observations 2006 2006 2006 2104
F test of excl. instr. 7.13 . . .
F test p value 0.0018 . . .
R2 .182 .049 .049 .098
Overid test . 0.76 1.181 0.901
Note: cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%;
constant not reported. Dependent variable is donor aid share in equation 1, and tied aid (definitions 1-3 respectively) in
equations 2-4.
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Table 8: cross sectional regression
equation no. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
variation base specification Tied aid (2) Tied aid (3) Multilateral share added Tied aid (2)
No. of Donors .013 .009 .008 .014 .009
(.003)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
log of population -.035 .027 -.023 .010 .021
(.023) (.014)∗ (.022) (.018) (.015)
Log of per capita income .026 .033 -.001 .050 .029
(.031) (.016)∗∗ (.024) (.020)∗∗ (.016)∗
LDC dummy -.104 -.099 -.064 -.093 -.101
(.058)∗ (.026)∗∗∗ (.042) (.034)∗∗∗ (.026)∗∗∗
log of total recipient aid -.036 -.057 -.052 -.056 -.054
(.033) (.022)∗∗∗ (.034) (.025)∗∗ (.022)∗∗
Aid/GNI -.118 .125 -.071 .114 .092
(.147) (.049)∗∗ (.086) (.062)∗ (.053)∗
multilateral aid share (excl. EC) . . . .153 -.027
(.077)∗∗ (.062)
EC aid share . . . 1.251 -.176
(.060)∗∗∗ (.049)∗∗∗
constant 1.183 .389 1.490 .393 .494
(.472)∗∗ (.227)∗ (.422)∗∗∗ (.290) (.236)∗∗
No. of observations 133 133 133 133 133
R2 .166 .319 .172 .719 .356
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. * significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.
Dependent variable is Tied aid definition 1, unless otherwise specified.
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